Art Appreciation An Analysis Of Dickies Criteria

George Dickie's institutional theory of art, first articulated in his 1974 work Art and the Aesthetic, offers a compelling, if controversial, answer to the perennial question: what is art? Rejecting traditional aesthetic approaches that sought defining properties inherent in artworks themselves—such as beauty, form, or expressiveness—Dickie proposed that an object becomes a work of art by virtue of its status within a social institution: the 'artworld.' This theory posits that an object is art if and only if it is an 'artifact of a kind as to which an art form is known to exist' and is presented to the artworld for appreciation. This essay will dissect Dickie's core arguments, contrast them with preceding aesthetic theories, and critically assess the theory's merits and shortcomings, particularly its implications for how we understand and engage with art.

Dickie's theory emerged as a direct challenge to theories that attempted to define art through intrinsic properties. Thinkers like Clive Bell, with his concept of 'significant form,' or Immanuel Kant, who emphasized disinterested aesthetic judgment, located the essence of art within the object's capacity to evoke a specific kind of experience in the viewer. These theories often struggled to account for art that was intentionally ugly, conceptually driven, or challenging to traditional aesthetic sensibilities. Dickie's institutional approach sidesteps these difficulties by shifting the locus of definition from the object's internal qualities to its social context. For Dickie, an object doesn't possess inherent artistic properties; rather, it acquires its status as art through the actions and judgments of individuals within the artworld. These individuals—artists, critics, curators, collectors, and audiences—collectively confer art status upon objects by treating them as candidates for appreciation within an established framework.

The central mechanism of Dickie's theory is the concept of 'candidacy for appreciation.' An object becomes a work of art when an artist creates it with the intention that it be regarded as a work of art, and it is subsequently presented to the artworld. The artworld, in turn, has established 'art forms' (e.g., painting, sculpture, music, poetry) that provide the context for this presentation. If an object is presented as a candidate for appreciation within an existing art form, and if that presentation is accepted by the artworld, then the object is indeed a work of art. This process is inherently social and historical; what counts as art is determined by the collective practices and conventions of the artworld at a given time. For instance, Marcel Duchamp's readymades, such as Fountain (1917), a urinal signed 'R. Mutt' and submitted to an exhibition, serve as a classic illustration. Prior to Duchamp, a urinal was merely a utilitarian object. However, by presenting it as a 'sculpture' to the art exhibition, Duchamp, as an artist, and the context of the exhibition, as part of the artworld, conferred upon it the status of art, inviting a specific kind of appreciation—or at least, consideration—that transcended its functional use.

The strengths of Dickie's institutional theory are considerable. Firstly, it possesses remarkable explanatory power. It can account for the art status of objects that traditional aesthetic theories find problematic, such as conceptual art, performance art, and found objects. Duchamp's urinal, or a pile of bricks presented as sculpture, are readily accommodated by the theory: they are artifacts presented for appreciation within an art form by participants in the artworld. Secondly, the theory acknowledges the social and historical contingency of art. It recognizes that what is considered art can change over time and across cultures, reflecting evolving conventions and practices rather than adherence to timeless aesthetic principles. This aligns with our intuitive understanding that the art world is a dynamic and often contested space. Thirdly, it provides a seemingly objective criterion for art status, grounding it in social practice rather than subjective taste. An object is art if the artworld says it is, not merely because an individual finds it beautiful or moving.

However, the theory is not without significant weaknesses. A primary criticism concerns its potential circularity. If art is defined by the artworld, and the artworld is composed of artists, critics, and audiences who recognize art, then the definition seems to rely on itself. How do we identify who the 'participants' in the artworld are, and what criteria do they use if not some implicit aesthetic judgment? Dickie attempts to resolve this by defining the artworld as 'the totality of all art enterprises' and identifying its members by their roles within these enterprises. Yet, critics argue this doesn't fully escape the circularity, as the 'art enterprises' themselves are defined by their engagement with art. Furthermore, the theory can be seen as overly inclusive, potentially leading to a situation where anything presented as art by an artist and accepted by a minimal segment of the artworld becomes art, regardless of its perceived quality or merit. This raises concerns about the devaluation of art and the role of critical judgment. Who decides what is worthy of appreciation? The theory seems to grant immense power to the 'gatekeepers' of the artworld, potentially leading to elitism and exclusion, where new or challenging forms of expression might be rejected simply because they do not fit established conventions or are not recognized by the dominant institutions.

Another challenge lies in defining the boundaries of the 'artworld' and the 'art form.' While examples like painting and sculpture are clear, what about emerging forms like digital art, bio-art, or even certain forms of social activism that blur the lines between art and life? Dickie's framework requires a pre-existing art form and participants who understand its conventions. This can be problematic for avant-garde movements that actively seek to disrupt or redefine existing art forms. The theory also faces difficulties when considering art created outside the established Western art institutions, such as indigenous art traditions or folk art, which may not have a clearly delineated 'artworld' in Dickie's sense. Does such art only become art when it is 'discovered' and legitimized by the Western artworld?

Despite these criticisms, Dickie's institutional theory remains a crucial contribution to aesthetic discourse. It rightly highlights the social construction of art and the importance of context and convention in our understanding of artistic value. While it may not provide a complete or universally accepted definition of art, it powerfully redirects our attention from purely intrinsic properties to the complex social, cultural, and historical forces that shape our perceptions and evaluations of art. In art appreciation, the theory encourages us to look beyond the object itself and consider its place within the broader ecosystem of artistic production, reception, and discourse. It prompts questions about who decides what art is, how that status is conferred, and what role institutions play in shaping our aesthetic experiences. Ultimately, Dickie's work forces us to acknowledge that art is not a timeless, self-evident category, but a continuously negotiated social phenomenon.