Conventionalist Ethical Relativism

Conventionalist ethical relativism posits that moral truths are not universal or objective, but rather are constituted by the prevailing customs, agreements, or conventions within a particular society or culture. Unlike descriptive relativism, which merely observes moral diversity, or subjectivism, which grounds morality in individual feelings, conventionalism anchors ethical standards in collective, implicit or explicit, social understandings. This perspective offers a compelling explanation for the vast differences in moral practices observed across human societies, suggesting that what is deemed right or wrong is fundamentally a product of social construction.

One of the primary strengths of conventionalist ethical relativism lies in its capacity to account for moral diversity. From prohibitions against incest to differing views on the treatment of the elderly, societies exhibit a wide array of moral codes. Conventionalism explains this by asserting that each society develops its own set of rules based on its unique history, environment, and social needs. For instance, a society that relies heavily on communal hunting might develop strong conventions around sharing resources, while a more individualistic society might prioritize property rights differently. This explanatory power makes conventionalism intuitively appealing, as it aligns with our empirical observations of cultural variation.

Furthermore, conventionalism often carries an implicit or explicit call for tolerance. If morality is relative to social conventions, then judging the practices of another culture by the standards of one's own becomes problematic, if not outright unjustified. This can foster a more open-minded approach to cultural differences, encouraging humility and respect for diverse ways of life. The idea that 'when in Rome, do as the Romans do' finds a philosophical underpinning here, suggesting that adherence to local customs is not merely pragmatic but ethically appropriate within the framework of conventionalism.

The appeal to tolerance, however, can also be a source of significant criticism. A major challenge for conventionalism is its apparent inability to provide a basis for criticizing deeply entrenched, unjust social conventions. If morality is simply what a society agrees upon, then practices like slavery, apartheid, or the systematic oppression of women, which were once widely accepted conventions in various societies, cannot be deemed objectively wrong. Critics argue that conventionalism effectively paralyzes moral critique, rendering it impossible to advocate for moral progress or reform. For example, abolitionists in the 19th century were, by conventionalist standards, acting immorally by challenging the prevailing social convention that sanctioned slavery. This outcome seems counterintuitive to many, who believe that certain moral reformers were indeed acting rightly, even if they were defying the norms of their time.

This leads to the problem of moral reform. If a society's conventions define its morality, how can an individual or a group within that society advocate for change? If the reformers are simply deviating from the norm, are they not, by definition, acting immorally according to the conventionalist framework? Conventionalism struggles to account for the moral legitimacy of dissent and reform movements. While proponents might argue that successful reformers eventually change the conventions, thus becoming the new moral standard, this still implies that their actions were initially immoral by the old standard, a conclusion many find difficult to accept. It suggests that figures like Martin Luther King Jr. or Mahatma Gandhi were, during their struggles, acting against the moral code of their respective societies, only becoming morally justified retrospectively when their ideas gained wider acceptance.

Another criticism concerns the very definition of a 'society' or 'culture' for the purpose of establishing moral conventions. Societies are rarely monolithic. Within any given group, there are often competing moral viewpoints and subcultures. Which set of conventions should be considered authoritative? Is it the majority view, the view of the ruling elite, or some aggregate of all views? Conventionalism often lacks a clear mechanism for resolving these internal conflicts or for determining which set of conventions holds sway. This ambiguity can lead to practical difficulties in applying the theory and can undermine its claim to provide clear moral guidance.

Moreover, the conventionalist position can inadvertently lead to a form of cultural imperialism if not carefully handled. While aiming for tolerance, the theory can sometimes be used to dismiss external criticism by simply stating that 'that's just their convention.' This can prevent meaningful dialogue and mutual learning between cultures. If all moral claims are reducible to local agreements, then there is no common ground for ethical discussion or for establishing universal human rights that transcend specific cultural norms. The idea of universal human rights, which many consider a cornerstone of modern ethics, poses a significant challenge to strict conventionalism.

In conclusion, conventionalist ethical relativism offers a valuable lens through which to understand the origins and diversity of moral practices. Its emphasis on social agreement and its promotion of tolerance are significant contributions to ethical discourse. However, its limitations, particularly its struggles with moral critique, reform, and the potential for internal conflict and external dismissal, render it an incomplete ethical framework. While acknowledging the profound influence of social conventions on our moral lives, a robust ethical system likely requires recourse to standards that extend beyond mere social agreement, allowing for the possibility of objective moral evaluation and the pursuit of moral progress.