Understanding Selective Incorporation

Selective incorporation is the legal principle by which the U.S. Supreme Court has applied most, but not all, of the protections found in the Bill of Rights to state governments. Prior to this doctrine, the Bill of Rights was understood to limit only the federal government. The Fourteenth Amendment, ratified after the Civil War, provided the constitutional vehicle for this incorporation, specifically through its Due Process Clause. Instead of applying the entire Bill of Rights to the states at once, the Court has adopted a case-by-case approach, determining which specific rights are so fundamental that they must be protected against state infringement.

Historical Context: From Barron to Gitlow

The initial understanding of the Bill of Rights, as established in Barron v. Baltimore (1833), was that its provisions applied solely to the federal government. This meant states could, for example, restrict freedom of speech or deny jury trials without violating the U.S. Constitution. The Civil War and the subsequent passage of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 fundamentally altered this constitutional landscape. The amendment's Due Process Clause stated, "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." However, the Supreme Court's interpretation of this clause, particularly in the Slaughter-House Cases (1873), initially limited its power to incorporate federal rights against the states. The modern era of incorporation began to take shape in the early 20th century, with the Court gradually identifying fundamental rights that transcended state autonomy. The landmark case of Gitlow v. New York (1925) marked a significant shift, as the Court, while upholding Gitlow's conviction, explicitly stated that freedom of speech and press were protected by the Fourteenth Amendment from state abridgment. This decision opened the door for the incorporation of other rights.

The Process of Incorporation: A Case-by-Case Approach

The Supreme Court's method of selective incorporation has been characterized by its gradual, incremental nature. Rather than a single ruling applying all amendments, the Court has reviewed individual rights and determined their applicability to the states. The standard often used, articulated in Palko v. Connecticut (1937), asks whether a right is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." This has led to the incorporation of most of the First Amendment freedoms, including speech (Gitlow), press (Near v. Minnesota, 1931), assembly (De Jonge v. Oregon, 1937), and religion (Cantwell v. Connecticut, 1940). Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and seizures were incorporated in Wolf v. Colorado (1949), and the exclusionary rule was applied to the states in Mapp v. Ohio (1961). Crucially, the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel was incorporated in Gideon v. Wainwright (1963), ensuring legal representation for indigent defendants in state courts. Other Sixth Amendment rights, such as the right to a speedy and public trial, an impartial jury, and to confront witnesses, have also been incorporated through various decisions.

Rights Not Yet Incorporated

While selective incorporation has been extensive, certain provisions of the Bill of Rights have not been applied to the states. The Third Amendment, concerning the quartering of soldiers, and the Fifth Amendment's requirement for a grand jury indictment in felony cases, remain unincorporated. The Second Amendment's right to bear arms was incorporated in McDonald v. City of Chicago (2010), but its application and scope at the state level continue to be subjects of legal interpretation and debate. The Seventh Amendment's right to a jury trial in civil cases has also not been fully incorporated, though some aspects have been recognized.

Significance and Criticisms

The doctrine of selective incorporation has been profoundly significant in shaping American civil liberties. It has established a national baseline for fundamental rights, preventing states from enacting laws that would deny citizens protections guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. This has been vital for ensuring equality and protecting individuals from state-level abuses. However, the process has faced criticism. Some argue that the Court has engaged in judicial activism, effectively creating law rather than interpreting it, and that the piecemeal approach has resulted in a complex and sometimes inconsistent body of jurisprudence. Debates persist regarding the appropriate scope of incorporation and the interpretation of rights when applied to state governments.

  • Application of the Bill of Rights to state governments.
  • Utilizes the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.
  • Proceeds on a case-by-case basis.
  • Focuses on rights deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty'.
  • Has incorporated most, but not all, of the Bill of Rights.
  • Ensures a national standard for civil liberties.
Analysis of McDonald v. City of Chicago

The Supreme Court's decision in McDonald v. City of Chicago (2010) is a critical case in the history of selective incorporation, particularly concerning the Second Amendment. Building upon its earlier ruling in District of Columbia v. Heller (2008), which held that the Second Amendment protects an individual's right to keep and bear arms for self-defense in the home and applies to the federal government, the McDonald Court extended this protection to the states. Justice Alito, writing for the plurality, argued that the right to self-defense is a "fundamental" right that is "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition" and is "necessary to our system of ordered liberty." He concluded that the Second Amendment is incorporated against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Justice Thomas, in a concurring opinion, argued for incorporation through the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause, asserting it was the original intent of the amendment. This decision affirmed that the Second Amendment, like most of the Bill of Rights, is not merely a constraint on federal power but a guarantee of individual liberty against state governments as well, though the precise scope of this right at the state level continues to be litigated.